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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
places the risk of antitrust liability on physicians who enter the
mainstream of commercial activity."
LIZANNE THOMAS
IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Federal Rule 60(b)
Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows courts to
vacate final judgments and requires the balancing of several competing
interests.' Courts must weigh the rights of the party seeking to have the
final judgment vacated against the rights of the non-moving party.2
Courts must also balance the need for finality in litigation' against the
51 See note 44 supra. Since the Fourth Circuit in Virginia Academy focused on the
physicians controlling the Blue Shield plans, in the future, Blue Shield may be able to avoid
antitrust scrutiny by eliminating unnecessary physician control. See Pertschuk, supra note
44.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly
discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in
time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an
adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from
the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable
time, and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
' See text accompanying notes 21-23 infra.
3 See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950) (litigation cannot continue
indefinitely); Marquette Corp. v. Priester, 234 F. Supp. 799, 803 (E.D.S.C. 1964) (finality of
judgments essential element of Anglo-American jurisprudence); Loucke v. United States, 21
F.R.D. 305, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (finality of judgments necessary to judicial administration
and stability of law). The doctrine of judicial finality promotes the efficient and orderly ad-
ministration of the judicial system. Moore & Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil Judgments,
55 YALE L.J. 623, 623 (1946); accord, Comment, Temporal Aspects of the Finality of
Judgments-the Significance of Federal Rule 60(b), 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 664 (1950).
Finality also confirms and maintains public trust in the judicial system because parties
would not bring their disputes before courts simply to win inconclusive judgments.
Southern Pac. R. R. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48 (1897); accord, Hart Steel Co. v. Railroad
Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917). Inconclusive judgments are undesirable because parties
cannot rely upon them, since a court might alter or reverse such judgments at a future time.
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desire to effect a just result between the parties.4 In Compton v. Alton
Steamship Co.,' the Fourth Circuit applied Rule 60(b) to vacate a clearly
erroneous judgment and achieve an equitable balance between the con-
flicting interests involved.
In Compton, a merchant seaman brought suit against Alton Steam-
ship Company for the recovery of wages earned while he was employed
on an Alton vessel.' Alton's claims manager mistakenly believed that
Bulk Food Carriers, the charterer of the vessel,7 was solely liable for the
claim and would defend against the claim in court.' Consequently, the
claims manager forwarded notice of the claim to Bulk Food Carriers, but
Alton neither answered Compton's complaint nor appeared in court.,
The district court awarded Compton a default judgment on the liability
issue, and set a hearing to determine damages." Alton's claims manager
forwarded notice of the hearing to Bulk Food Carriers, and Alton failed
to answer or appear at the damages hearing.1
At the damages hearing, Compton supplemented his request for
wages with a claim for penalty damages under Section 596 of the Mer-
chant Seaman Act.2 The statute imposes a substantial monetary penalty
upon any shipowner who wrongfully witholds a seaman's due wages at
the completion of a voyage." Section 596 applies only to wages earned
See Comment Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b): Standards for Relief from Judgments
Due to Changes in Law, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 648-49 (1976).
' Boughner v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 572 F.2d 976, 977 (3rd Cir. 1978);
Banker's Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 927
(1970); In re Casco Chem. Co., 335 F.2d 645, 651 (5th Cir. 1964); see Kane, Relief from
Federal Judgments: A Morass Unrelieved by a Rule, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 41, 68-70 (1978);
Comment, Rule 60(b): Survey and Proposal for General Reform, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 531, 533
(1972). See generally, Note, Filling the Void. Judicial Power and Jurisdictional Attacks on
Judgments, 87 YALE L.J. 164, 182-92 (1977).
608 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1979).
6 Id. at 98, 101.
Id. at 98.
Id. at 103.
Id. at 99, 103.
'o Id. at 99.
" Id. at 99, 103.
" Id. at 99; see 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1976).
, 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1976). The purpose of§ 596 of the Merchant Seaman Act is to ensure
that a master or shipowner does not set a seaman ashore without funds at the conclusion of
a voyage. See Mavromatis v. United Greek Shipowners Corp., 179 F.2d 310, 315 (1st Cir.
1950); Underwood v. Isbrandtsen Co., 100 F. Supp. 863, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). The statute
reflects the paternalistic view traditionally taken by the courts toward a class of workers
considered to be largely at the mercy of their employers. See 179 F.2d at 315.
Section 596 holds an employer liable to an unpaid seaman for double the seaman's nor-
mal wages for every day the wages remain unpaid. 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1976). Court rigorously
apply the double wage provision in order to protect seamen from the harsh consequences of
arbitrary and unscrupulous employer action. Collie v. Ferguson, 281 U.S. 52, 55-56 (1929).
Where the shipowner offers a valid excuse for non-payment, however, the double wage pro-
vision is inapplicable. 281 U.S. at 56; see American S.S. Co. v. Matise, 423 U.S. 150, 160
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during a voyage and is inapplicable to wages earned on port time."
Although Compton's claim was for wages earned during six days of port
time, the district judge nevertheless awarded penalty damages under
Section 596.1 The penalty damages, totaling $58,340.80 greatly exceeded
Compton's original claim of $312.54 for unpaid wages." Less than ten
days later, Alton moved for vacation of judgment under Rule 60(b).'7 The
district judge denied the motion, and Alton promptly appealed. 8
Courts will not allow a defendant to relitigate an action when the
defendant lacks a valid defense. 9 Consequently, under Rule 60(b)
analysis a party seeking to vacate a final judgment must show a meri-
torious defense to the claim upon which judgment has been rendered
before i court will consider the motion.21 Moreover, once the moving
party establishes the existence of a meritorious defense, the moving
party must persuade the court that vacation of the judgment will not
seriously predjudice the non-moving party and thereby substitute one
(1975), rehearing denied, 424 U.S. 979 (1975). In Matise a merchant seaman was discharged
from his vessel for misconduct. 423 U.S. at 152-53. At the time of his discharge, the vessel
was docked at a foreign port. Id. at 152. Because of difficulties in paying Matise immediately,
in United States currency, the master of the vessel bought Matise an airplane ticket to the
United'States and gave him a wage voucher for his remaining wages minus the cost of the
ticket. Id. at 153-54. Matise later sued the shipowning company and claimed that the pur-
chase of the airplane ticket, rather than immediate cash payment, violated § 596. Id. at 154.
The Supreme Court held that despite the protective purpose of § 596, the employer's pur-
chase of the airline ticket constituted a payment of wages and therefore did not violate the
statute. Id. at 156-60.
" 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1976); see Pacific Mail S.S. Co. v. Schmidt, 241 U.S. 245, 250 (1916);
Eaton v. S.S. Export Challenger, 376 F.2d 725, 726 (1967). Port time refers to day-to-day
employment aboard ship at a time when the vessel is between voyages. See 376 F.2d 725,
726 n.1; note 13 supra.
" 608 F.2d at 99-100.
Id. Compton originally claimed port time benefits totaling $312.54. Id. at 99-100.
" Id. at 100.
"sId.
" United States v. $3,216.59 in United States Currency, 41 F.R.D. 433, 434 (D.S.C.
1967); Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Alker, 30 F.R.D. 527, 532 (E.D. Pa. 1967); see Comment,
Equitable Power of a Federal Court to Vacate a Final Judgment for "Any Other Reason
Justifying Relief --Rule 601b)(6), 33 Mo. L. REV. 427, 433-34 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Equitable Power].
" See In re Stone, 588 F.2d 1316, 1319 (10th Cir. 1978); Rutland Transit Co. v. Chicago
Tunnel Terminal Co., 233 F.2d 655, 656-57 (7th Cir. 1956); Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Mill-
ing Co., 189 F.2d 242, 244-45 (3rd Cir. 1951). The moving party must offer specific facts sug-
gesting the existence of a meritorious defense to the claim. 588 F.2d at 1319-20; Con-
solidated Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Constr. Corp., 383 F.2d 249, 251-52 (4th
Cir. 1967). The mere allegation of the existence of a meritorious defense is insufficient. See
Gomes v Williams, 420 F.2d 1364,1366 (10th Cir. 1970) (unsupported allegation not helpful in
meritorious defense determination); Madsen v. Bumb, 419 F.2d 4, 6 (9th Cir. 1969) (general
denial supported by unrelated counterclaim insufficient to establish meritorious defense);
383 F.2d at 151-52 (bare allegation of existence of alleged meritorious defense led court to
conduct own factual inquiry).
1981]
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inequity for another.2' Such predjudice may arise when the non-moving
party has relied upon the judgment, and vacation would effect the non-
moving party adversely.22 Similarly, vacation would predjudice the non-
moving party when an alteration in circumstances precludes the non-
moving party from effective relitigation upon remand.'
In Compton, the Fourth Circuit found initially that Alton had a
meritorious defense to Compton's claim for statutory damages since sec-
tion 596 of the Merchant Seaman Act does not apply to wages earned on
port time." Moreover, the Fourth Circuit determined that vacating the
judgment would not predjudice compton because vacation would deprive
Compton only of statutory damages to which he was not entitled.' The
Fourth Circuit then proceeded to examine Alton's alleged grounds for
relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).
Rule 60(b)(1) allows courts to vacate a judgment that is the result of
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Courts construe
Rule 60(b)(1) liberally in order to allow full development of the merits of
a particular case.' Consequently, trial courts enjoy a large measure of
21 See Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242, 246 (3rd Cir. 1951);
Equitable Power, supra note 19, at 433.
' See Meadows v. Cohen, 409 F.2d 750, 753 (5th Cir. 1969); Erick Rios Bridoux v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 214 F.2d 207, 210 (D.C. Cir.), cerL denied, 348 U.S. 821 (1954); Vec-
chione v. Wohlgemuth, 426 F. Supp. 1297, 1311-12 (E.D. Pa. 1977). An alteration in a party's
circumstances or lifestyle, in reliance upon the anticipated receipt of a financial award, may
preclude a Rule 60(b) motion by the opposing party. See 409 F.2d at 753. Prejudice may even
arise when a non-moving party reasonably believes itself entitled to a forthcoming award or
rebate, particularly if the moving party had acted so as to create a reasonable expectation
of payment. See 426 F. Supp. at 1311-12 (vacation prejudicial where moving party published
terms of consent decree in newspaper and parties initiated implementation of decree).
I See Rinieri v. News Syndicate Co., 385 F.2d 818, 823 (2d Cir. 1967) (relitigation of
"stale" defamation claim two-and-one-half years after judgment held prejudicial to non-
moving party); McCawley v. Fleischmann Transp. Co., 10 F.R.D. 624, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)
(relitigation seven years after judgment held prejudicial to non-moving party where
witnesses geographically dispersed).
608 F.2d at 103; see note 14 supra.
608 F.2d at 103.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1); see note 1 supra.
2 See Roberts v. Rehoboth Pharmacy, Inc., 574 F.2d 846, 847-48 (5th Cir. 1978);
Greater Baton Rouge Golf Ass'n. v. Recreation & Park Comm., 507 F.2d 227, 228-29 (5th Cir.
1975). A party's failure to appear at trial due to a sudden violent illness may constitute ex-
cusable neglect and inadvertence. See Ten v. Svenska Orient Linen, 573 F.2d 772, 774-75 (2d
Cir.), cerL denied, 439 U.S. 834 (1978). In addition, relief may be appropriate under the ex-
cusable neglect clause of Rule 60(b)(1) when a party fails to have substitute counsel file
notice of appearance within ten days. See Roberts v. Rehoboth Pharmacy, Inc., 574 F.2d
846, 847-48 (5th Cir. 1978). An attorney's lack of familiarity with local or federal rules of civil
procedure may also constitute excusable neglect. See A.F. Dormeyer Co. v. M.J. Sales &
Distrib. Co., 461 F.2d 40, 42-43 (7th Cir. 1972). An unauthorized stipulation of fact by a
party's attorney may lead to vacation under Rule 60(b). See Freeman v. MacCarthy, 153
F.2d 1001, 1004-06 (3rd Cir. 1946). A defaulting party's inadvertent late arrival in court may
be a proper ground for vacation under Rule 60(b)(1) even though the party's conduct
demonstrates a "failure of good judgment" and is "an affront to the court." Peterson v.
Term Taxi, Inc., 429 F.2d 888, 891-92 (2d Cir. 1970).
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discretion in all Rule 60(b)(1) issues.' Following the rule of liberal inter-
pretation, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that Alton's neglect may
have been excusable.' The Fourth Circuit, however, held itself bound by
the district court's ruling that Alton's neglect was inexcusable."0 Since
the district court's ruling was not an abuse of discretion, the Fourth Cir-
cuit denied Alton's request for relief under the excusable neglect clause
of Rule 60(b)(1). "
The Fourth Circuit next considered whether the term "mistake" in
Rule 60(b)(1) encompasses a clear mistake of law by the court.2 Alton
contended that the district court's misapplication of section 596 con-
stituted mistake under Rule 60(b)(1) and therefore merited vacation.' As
originally drafted, Rule 60(b)(1) restricted mistake to "his mistake",
meaning the mistake of the moving party." The 1946 revision of the Rule
deleted the qualifying pronoun "his", in order to include errors made by
persons other than the moving party.' The rationale for the revision is
that mistakes committed by third parties can be equally as costly to a
party as his own mistakes. 8 The Fourth Circuit neither accepted nor re-
jected Alton's mistake argument. Rather, the Fourth Circuit declined to
apply the mistake argument since other, more simple approaches
governed the case.37
, Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n. v. Mamakos, 509 F.2d 1217, 1219 (9th Cir.
1975); Beshear v. Weinzapfel, 474 F.2d 127, 130-34 (7th Cir. 1972); see 7 MOORE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 60.19 (2d ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as 7 MOORE]; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2857 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 11 WRIGHT & MILLER].
Under Rule 60(b) broad trial court discretion is proper because the trial judge, who directly
sees and hears evidence and witnesses, is in a better position than an appellate court to
determine matters of credibility. See Farmer's Co-op. Elevator Ass'n. Non-Stock v. Strand,
382 F.2d 224, 231-32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1014 (1967); International Nikoh Corp.
v. H.K. Porter Co., 374 F.2d 82,84 (7th Cir. 1967). A trial court abuses its discretion in deter-
mining a question under Rule 60(b) only if no reasonable man could agree with the trial
court's decision. See Smith v. Widman Trucking & Excavating, 627 F.2d 792, 795-96 (7th Cir.
1980); see also Ruiz v. Hamburg-American Line, 478 F.2d 29, 31 (9th Cir. 1973).




I See 7 MOORE, supra note 28, 60.22[3] at 258-59.
SId.
Id. at 60.22[1] n.9.
608 F.2d at 104. Acceptance of the mistake argument would have required analysis
of the inter-relationships between the various time limits governing the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Alton's interpretation of mistake allows courts the power of self-correction
under Rule 60(b)(1), which would aid judicial efficiency by obviating the necessity for an ap-
peal. See 7 MOORE, supra note 28, 60.22[3] at 259-60; accord, Gila River Ranch, Inc. v.
United States, 368 F.2d 354, 357 (9th Cir. 1966); McDowell v. Celebreezze, 310 F.2d 43, 44
(5th Cir. 1962). The time limit governing Rule 60(b)(1) is a "reasonable" period of time which
may not exceed one year. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); note 1 supra. Courts do not allow the full one
year period of time under all circumstances. See Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 531 (2d
1981]
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After declining to grant relief under the excusable neglect and
mistake provisions of Rule 60(b)(1), the Fourth Circuit vacated the judg-
ment under Rule 60(b)(4).' Rule 60(b)(4) authorizes the vacation of a void
judgment. 9 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(c) provides that a judg-
ment is void if it differs from or exceeds in amount the relief requested
in the complaint. 0 Compton had won a default judgment that exceeded
the relief prayed for in his complaint by over $50,000.1 The Fourth Cir-
Cir. 1964) (8 month delay unreasonable). But see Rocky Mtn. Tool & Mach. Co. v. Tecon
Corp., 371 F.2d 589, 597 (10th Cir. 1966) (91 day delay reasonable). Courts uniformly deny
"mistake" motions brought more than one year after the date of judgment. See Tobriner v.
Chefer, 335 F.2d 281, 282-83 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Morgan v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.,
52 F.R.D. 25, 26-27 (W.D. La. 1967). The filing of a motion for appeal does not extend the one
year limitation governing the filing of a Rule 60(b)(1) motion. See Bershad v. McDonough,
469 F.2d 1333, 1336 (7th Cir. 1972); Transit Cas. Co. v. Security Trust Co., 441 F.2d 788, 791
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 883 (1971). Rules 59(d) and 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, however, specifically grant the power of self-correction to the federal courts,
while imposing a ten day time limit upon the exercise of this power. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(dl(e).
Since bringing a Rule 60(b)(1) motion rather than a Rule 59(d) or 59(e) motion circumvents
the ten day time limit governing motions to amend judgment, the mistake argument is
proper only when brought within a ten-day time limit. See Silk v. Sandoval, 435 F.2d 1266,
1267-68 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1012 (1971); Meadows v. Cohen, 409 F.2d 750, 752 n.4
(5th Cir. 1969); see 7 MOORE, supra note 28, 60.22[3] at 259, 266, & 268; Note, Federal Rule
60b: Finality of Civil Judgments v. Self-Correction by District Court of Judicial Error of
Law, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 98, 100-104 (1967). Since Alton brought its Rule 60(b)(1) motion
within a ten day time period, accepting the mistake argument would not have nullified the
time provisions of Rules 59(d) and 59(e).
608 F.2d at 104.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4); note 1 supra. Since a void judgment is a legal nullity, a court
must vacate under Rule 60(b)(4) if the moving party establishes that the judgment is void.
Jordan v. Gilligan, 500 F.2d 701, 704 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1974); Austin v.
Smith, 312 F.2d 337, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Hicklin v. Edwards, 226 F.2d 410, 413 (8th Cir.
1955); see 11 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 28, § 2862.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 54(c); see SEC v. Wenke, 577 F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 964 (1978). In Wencke, the trial court granted an injunction and receivership order re-
quested by the SEC, but extended its order to several companies not named in the SEC's
complaint. 577 F.2d at 623. The judgment was entered by default. Id. at 621. The Ninth Cir-
cuit reversed on the grounds that the judgment violated Rule 54(c) since the relief granted
differed from the relief prayed for. I& at 623. See generally 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER.
Federal Practice and Procedure, 2663 at 100 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 10 WRIGHT &
MILLER].
A judgment may also be void if the court that awarded it lacked jurisdiction over the
subject matter or the parties or entered a decree which was not within the court's powers.
In re Four Seasons Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834, 842 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1034 (1974); Marshall v. Board of Ed., 575 F.2d 417, 422 (3rd. Cir. 1978); 11 WRIGHT
& MILLER, supra note 27, § 2862. A judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous or
based upon precedent which is later found incorrect or unconstitutional. In re Four Seasons
Securities Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d at 842; Marshall v. Board of Ed., 575 F.2d at 422.
Judicial error so gross as to violate due process of law, however, may render a judgment
void. See V.T.A., Inc. v. Arico, Inc., 597 F.2d 220, 224-25 (10th Cir. 1979); 502 F.2d at 842. See
also Crosby v. Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483, 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 911 (1963)
(decision violative of first amendment held void).
1 608 F.2d at 99-100; see text accompanying note 16 supra.
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cuit, therefore, reversed the district court's decision and vacated the
penalty damages award."
Rather than rely solely on Rule 60(b)(4), the Fourth Circuit examined
the applicability of Rule 60(b)(6) to the facts in Compton.43 Rule 60(b)(6)
provides that a court may relieve a party from an improperly awarded
judgment for "any other reason justifying relief."" This catch-all clause
allows a court to promote complete fairness in unusual cases where vaca-
tion is proper, but the specific provisions of Rules 60(b)(1)-(5) are inapplic-
able." Rule 60(b)(6) is not an unlimited endorsement for vacation of
judgments, however, and courts limit the use of Rule 60(b)(6) to cases in-
volving extreme hardship. 8 Rule 60(b)(6) offers the courts maximum flex-
ibility to vacate unfair judgments, while preserving the finality of
judgments. Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit allowed Alton's claim for
relief under Rule 60(b)(6).4
The Fourth Circuit's treatment of Alton's claim of excusable neglect
demonstrates strict adherence to the rule of allowing broad trial court
discretion in Rule 60(b) issues.49 A close question arose whether Alton's
neglect was inexcusable." Alton's conduct, however, indicated the
42 608 F.2d at 104-06.
Id. at 106-07.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); note 1 supra.
,3 FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); note 1 supra. The plain meaning of "any other reason" in
Rule 60(b)(6) is "any reason not encompassed in the provisions of Rule 60(b)(1-5)." 7 MOORE,
supra note 28, 60.27[1] at 340-41. The Supreme Court has adopted this interpretation of
Rule 60(b)(6). See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197 (1950); Klapprott v. United
States, 335 U.S. 601, 613-14, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949). See generally 11 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 28, § 2864 at 216-17; Equitable Power, supra note 19, at 434-441.
" See, e.g., Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193,200 (1950) (Rule 60(b)(6) reserved
for extraordinary circumstances); Gray v. Estelle, 574 F.2d 209, 215 (5th Cir. 1978) (vacating
judgment because of moving party's attorney's conflict of interests); In re Cremidas' Estate,
14 F.R.D. 15, 17-18 (D. Alaska 1953) (vacating judgment when minor's attorney so in-
capacitated at trial as to preclude effective representation).
' See, e.g., Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 197-202 (1950); Klapprott v.
United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613-16 (1949). Both cases involved petitions to reopen default
judgments of denaturalization. 340 U.S. at 194; 335 U.S. at 602-03. The Supreme Court in
Ackermann denied Rule 60(b) relief to petitioner, who claimed that he had not appealed his
default judgment because of financial inability to do so. 340 U.S. at 202. The Court held that
Ackermann's actions demonstrated a conscious choice not to appeal, rather than an extraor-
dinary excuse for not appealing. Id. at 197-98. In contrast, the Klapprott Court granted Rule
60(b)(6) relief. 335 U.S. at 615-16. Klapprott was in prison on an unrelated charge at the time
he suffered his default judgment, and despite due diligence he failed to answer the com-
plaint or appear in court. Id. at 604-08. The Court held that the "extraordinary" cir-
cumstances of the Klapprott case warranted relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Id. at 613.
" 608 F.2d at 106. The Fourth Circuit vacated the award of damages, but upheld the
default judgment as to $312.54, the amount of Compton's original claim. Id.
" See text accompanying note 28 supra.
Courts have allowed relief in circumstances similar to the facts of Compton. See,
e.g., Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 189 F.2d 242,243-46 (3rd Cir. 1951) (moving par-
ty's careless internal procedures for receipt of service of process); Standard Grate Bar Co.
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possibility that its failure to answer Compton's complaint or appear in,
court was due to a conscious decision to suffer a default judgment rather
than pay the cost of defending an apparently minor claim.51 The trial
court acted within its discretion in determining that Alton's default was
due either to carelessness or to a conscious choice not to litigate the
claim. In holding itself bound by the district court's determination that
Alton's neglect was inexcusable, the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed the rule
of broad trial court discretion in Rule 60(b) issues.
The Compton court's Rule 60(b)(4) analysis is consistent with Rule
54(c)'s fundamental fairness requirement for default judgments. Fun-
damental fairness requires that a party have notice of the existence and
exact nature of a claim brought against him.52 Receiving notice allows
the party to make a fully informed decision whether to contest the claim
or suffer a default judgment. 3 By granting Compton's request for
damages which exceeded the relief prayed for in his complaint, the
district court denied Alton the right to make a fully informed decision
concerning the disposition of the claim. By using Rule 60(b)(4) to vacate
the district court's judgment, the Fourth Circuit reinstated Alton's right
to receive notice of the claim and to decide whether to defend or
default. 4
The Fourth Circuit bolstered its treatment of the voidness issue by
granting relief under Rule 60(b)(6). Both case law and the language of
Rule 60(b)(6) restrict the use of the catch-all provision to those occasions
where the specific provisions of Rules 60(b)(1)-(5) are inapplicable.55 Thus,
where relief is possible under either one of the specific provisions of
Rules 60(b)(1)-(5) or under the catch-all clause, courts apply the specific
v. Defense Plant Corp., 3 F.R.D. 371, 371-72 (M.D. Pa. 1944) (party erroneously believed
codefendant would defend suit for both parties). Courts do not, however, accord relief for
simple carelessness, and the district court could have decided that Alton's conduct was mere
carelessness. See, e.g., Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 382-83 (1st Cir. 1974) (corporate
party's failure to direct notice to proper officer carelessness rather than excusable neglect);
Design & Dev., Inc. v. Vibromatic Mfg., Inc., 58 F.R.D. 71, 73 (E.D. Pa. 1973) (reliance on
representation by co-defendant's attorney that party "had nothing to worry about" mere
carelessness).
"' 608 F.2d at 103. Courts do not grant relief where a party has made a conscious
choice to settle, compromise, or accept a default judgment. See, e.g., United States v. Er-
doss, 440 F.2d 1221, 1223 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 849 (1971) (default judgment in
bankruptcy proceeding binding even though unanticipated recoverable assets existed);
Allinsmith v. Funke, 421 F.2d 1350, 1351 (6th Cir. 1970) (consent decree accepted by corpora-
tion's board of trustees not subject to vacation when three board members changed their
minds).
2 See 10 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 40, § 2663 at 99.
5 Id.
-1 See 608 F.2d at 106. Previous cases applying Rule 60(b)(4) have involved judgments
that were void for lack of personal or subject matter jurisdiction. See note 40 supra; see
generally, 7 MOORE, supra note 28, 60.25111-[2].
I See note 45 supra.
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provision." Under the unusual circumstances of the Compton case,
however, the Fourth Circuit acted properly by granting relief in the
alternative. The time limitations for bringing Rule 60(b)(4) and Rule
60(b)(6) motions are identical, so granting alternative relief under the
two provisions raises no timing conflict.,7 Since Alton's motion for vaca-
tion satisfied both relevant time provisions, strict categorization and
separation of the two grounds for relief was not necessary. 8
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Compton reflects an understanding
of the need to balance fairness, finality, and the rights of the parties
when resolving issues arising under Rule 60(b). By exploring four
separate grounds for vacation and by granting relief in the alternative
under two of those grounds, the Fourth Circuit demonstrated full use of
the flexibility that Rule 60(b) allows the courts, while reducing the
chance of reaching an incorrect decision. Moreover, the Fourth Circuit's
analysis gives proper weight to the need for finality by respecting the
discretionary power of the trial court under the provisions of Rule 60(b).
Thus, the Fourth Circuit, in Compton v. Alton Steamship Co., effectively
utilized the broad powers granted by Rule 60(b) while underscoring the
obvious fairness of vacating a previous judgment when merited under
particular circumstances.
BROOKS D. KUBIK
B. Application of Erie: Conflict Between State Substantive
Law and Federal Rule 15
The Supreme Court determined in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins' that
federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state substantive law and
Icd.; see, e.g., De Filippis v. United States, 567 F.2d 341, 343 (7th Cir. 1977) (party in-
voking Rule 60(b)(5) cannot also claim relief under Rule 60(b)(6)); Carr v. District of Colum-
bia, 543 F.2d 917, 926 n.76 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (Rule 60(b)(6) inapplicable if relief was earlier
available under Rules 60(b)(1-(5)); Stradley v. Cortez, 518 F.2d 488, 493-94 (3rd Cir. 1975)
(Rule 60(b)(6) inapplicable merely to extend time limitation governing Rule 60(b)(1)); Ser-
zysko v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 461 F.2d 699, 701-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 883
(1972) (rule 60(b)(6) inapplicable merely to extend time limitation governing Rules 60(b}(2)-(3));
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Supply Co. v. International Bhd. of Elec. Wkrs. Local No. 380, 460 F.2d
105, 108 (5th Cir. 1972) (Rules 60(b)(4)-(6) inapplicable to extend time limitation governing
Rule 60(b)(1)).
', FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4), (6); see note 1 supra.
See 7 MOORE, supra note 28, 60.27[1] at 346-47. See also In re Four Seasons Sec.
Laws Litigation, 502 F.2d 834, 841 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974).
' 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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federal procedural law.' The Erie Court created the substance-pro-
cedure distinction to discourage forum shopping and to avoid inequitable
administration of the laws.' Although the aims of the Erie doctrine were
clear, courts had difficulty applying the substance versus procedure
distinction.4 In repeated efforts to clarify Erie, the Supreme Court has
moved from an interpretation that is highly protective of state rights' to
I Id. at 78-80. Federal district courts have diversity jurisdiction over controversies
between citizens of different states and between a state or its citizens and foreign states or
their citizens. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
The Rules of Decision Act (Act), 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976), requires federal district
courts to apply state law except where the Constitution or an act of Congress requires
otherwise. The Supreme Court originally interpreted the Act to apply to state statutory
law and not to state common law. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 166, 16 Pet. 1 (1842). Federal
courts therefore could apply their own interpretation of the general common law in
disregard of state judicial decisions. 41 U.S. at 170-71.
The Supreme Court in Erie discarded the common law -statutory law distinction by
overruling Swift. 304 U.S. at 77-78. In Erie, a door-like appendage of a train struck Tomp-
kins as he was walking near railroad tracks. Id. at 69. Tompkins brought a negligence claim
against the railroad in a federal district court alleging that the court had jurisdiction on the
basis of diversity of citizenship. Id Tompkins prevailed in district court and on appeal the
Second Circuit affirmed. Id. at 70. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue
whether to apply state or federal law to Tompkin's claim. Id. at 71. Under state law, the
Court would have regarded Tompkins as a trespasser and absolved the railroad of liability.
Under federal law, the Court would have regarded him as a licensee and imposed liability on
the railroad. Id. at 70. The Erie Court held that state law, not federal common law, deter-
mined the substantive question whether Tompkins was a licensee or a trespasser. Id. at
79-80. The original Erie rule requires federal courts to respect state created rights by ap-
plying state substantive law, whether statutory or judicial. Id.; see 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 952,
954 (1975).
The Erie doctrine pervades the jurisprudence of the federal court system. Clark,
State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. Tompkins, 55
YALE L.J. 267, 269 (1946). Judge Learned Hand once remarked that counsel could no longer
argue a civil appeal without quoting large portions of Erie. Id.
' 304 U.S. at 73. Erie's twin aims of avoidance of forum shopping and inequitable ad-
ministration of the laws were based on the theories that to apply federal substantive law
would invade the state's sovereignty and to apply state procedural law would destroy
uniformity in the federal system. Id. at 74-78. Commentators have noted, however, that
Erie's "twin aims" may be a singular aim. Forum shopping itself may be desirable as a
means of avoiding inequitable administration of the law in a state court by allowing a plain-
tiff to litigate in an unbiased federal forum. See Hart, The Relations Between State and
Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 512-13 (1954); McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doc-
trine Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REV. 884, 889 (1965) [hereinafter cited as McCoid].
' See notes 5 & 6 infra. See also C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, § 55 at
255, 258 (3d ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT].
' In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), the Supreme Court held that
federal courts siting in diversity must apply state law if application of federal law would
yield a substantially different result. Id. at 109. The Court interpreted Erie to mean that
the accident of having to bring suit in a federal court rather than a state court should not
lead to a different outcome. Id. Guaranty Trust, therefore, required that the outcome of a
trial in a federal court, insofar as legal rules are determinative, should be substantially the
same as a trial in a state court. Id. Commentators view Guaranty Trust as extremely, and
perhaps excessively, protective of state rights. Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87
HARV. L. REv. 693, 696 n.26 [hereinafter cited as Ely].
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an interpretation that favors the application of federal laws.' In Davis v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., the Fourth Circuit applied Hanna v. Plumer,8 the
Supreme Court's most recent clarification of Erie. The court addressed a
conflict between a state law regarding capacity to bring wrongful death
actions and rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concerning
amendments.9
The Court qualified Guaranty Trust's outcome determinative test in Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958). The Byrd Court interpreted Erie to require a
balance between the state's interest in having state laws applied and the federal interest in
preserving the independence of the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts. Id. at
537-38. Byrd indicated that courts should consider countervailing federal interests in apply-
ing the outcome determinative test. Id. at 539-40; see 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 430, 431
(1980).
'See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 474 (1965). In Hanna, the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue whether service of process on an executor at his usual place of abode, as
authorized by FED. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), will suffice where state law requires in-hand service on
an executor. Id- at 461-62. The Court held that the Federal Rules should be applied. Id. at
474.
Hanna distinguished between federal judge-made rules and federal statutory rules
and required that a court measure a federal judge-made rule by Erie and her progeny. Id. at
470. To measure the validity of such a rule, the Hanna Court indicated that courts should
apply Guaranty Trust's outcome determinative test with due consideration of Erie's twin
aims. Id. at 468; see note 5 supra. Notably, the outcome determinative test effectuates
Erie's aims only if a court applies the test prospectively because a litigant will forum shop
precisely to bring about substantially different results. See Note, Erie-York Doctrine Does
Not Govern Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 27 OHIO S. L. J. 345, 351 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Erie-York Doctrine].
The issue in Hanna, however, was the validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.
The Hanna Court held that the validity of a Federal Rule should be tested under the Consti-
tution and the Rules Enabling Act. In the constitutional analysis, the Hanna Court fleetingly
mentioned the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I of the Constitution, the provision
for a federal court system in Article III, and "some other section of the Constitution." Id. at
471-72. Commentators have criticized Hanna's sparse constitutional analysis. See Note, 44
N.C. L. REV. 180, 185 (1965); WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 56 at 260. Extensive constitutional
analysis may not be necessary in Federal Rule choice of law cases, however, because the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are presumptively procedural and therefore within the
authority of Article Ill. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941). In Sibbach, the
Supreme Court defined procedure as the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties
recognized by substantive law, and the process for justly administering remedy and redress
for disregard or infraction of substantive rights. Id.
The Hanna Court based the second portion of the analysis on the Rules Enabling Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1976). 380 U.S. at 471. The Rules Enabling Act provides in pertinent part
that "[t]he Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe, by general rules ... the prac-
tice and procedure of the district courts of the United States in civil actions .... Such rules
shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right ..... Id. The Hanna Court noted
that both Erie and the Rules Enabling Act require courts to apply state substantive law and
federal procedural law, but that the former controls federal judge-made rules and the latter
controls the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See 380 U.S. at 470-71. See generally 9
AKRON L. REV. 199 (1975) [hereinafter cited as AKRON].
615 F.2d 606 (4th Cir. 1980).
'Id. at 611; Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); see note 6 supra.
See text accompanying notes 14-15 infra.
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Plaintiff Davis, the executor of an Alabama decedent's estate,
brought a wrongful death action in the District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina.0 Defendant Piper Aircraft moved for
dismissal of the action, on the ground that the plaintiff lacked legal
capacity to bring suit because he had not qualified in North Carolina as
an ancillary administrator." After the statute of limitations had
expired, 2 the plaintiff qualified as an ancillary administrator and moved
under the Federal Rules to amend his complaint to indicate this ca-
pacity."3 Although state law prohibits amendments reflecting capacity
once the statute of limitations has expired, 4 the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure permit such amendments to overcome the statute of limita-
tions bar provided no prejudice results." The district court held that
"' 615 F.2d at 608. The wrongful death action in Davis arose from a crash of a Piper
Aircraft in North Carolina. The pilot and his two passengers died in the crash. Personal
representatives of the two passengers brought wrongful death actions against the pilot and
Piper Aircraft in Alabama state courts. In one case, the plaintiffs obtained a judgment
against both of the defendants. In the other case, the parties reached a settlement. Jimmy
P. Davis, the plaintiff in Davis, received his appointment as executor of the pilot's estate
from an Alabama probate court. Id. at 609.
1 Id Wrongful death actions in North Carolina may be brought only by a personal
representative of the decedent in his representative capacity. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28A-18-2,
28A-18-3 (1976). A foreign personal representative lacks such capacity unless she has first
qualified in North Carolina as an ancillary administrator. Id. § 28A-26-3. A personal
representative must satisfy bond requirements and file certified copies of letters of appoint-
ment with the clerk of the superior court who will grant the ancillary letters. I&; see id. §
28A-26-4.
"' The North Carolina statute of limitations for wrongful death actions is two years.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-53(4) (1976). Plaintiff's appointment took place nine months after the
state's statute of limitations had run. 615 F.2d at 609.
" 615 F.2d at 609. Plaintiff moved to amend his complaint under FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
Rule 15(a) states that once a responsive pleading such as defendant's answer has been served,
leave to amend a pleading is subject to the consent of the adverse party or of the court. In
Davis, there is no indication that the adverse party consented to plaintiff's proferred
amendments. Leave to amend, therefore, was in the court's discretion. 615 F.2d at 609; see
text accompanying notes 27-37 infra.
" The majority of North Carolina cases are consistent with code authorities on
pleading, under which an amendment to a complaint to show capacity as an administrator
represents an entirely new cause of action. See, e.g., Sims v. Rea Construction Co., 25 N.C.
App. 472, 473, 213 S.E.2d 398, 399 (1975); Johnson v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 22 N.C.
App. 8, 10, 205 S.E.2d 353, 355 (1974). Plaintiffs are barred from bringing any such new
cause of action after the expiration of the statute of limitations. 22 N.C. App. at 10, 205
S.E.2d at 355. Nevertheless, at least two cases applying North Carolina law have held that
the code did not control and have allowed the amended complaint reflecting capacity to be
considered as part of the original cause of action. McNamara v. Kerr-McGee Chemical
Corp., 328 F. Supp. 1058, 1061 (E.D.N.C. 1971); Graves v. Welborn, 260 N.C. 688, 696-97, 133
S.E.2d 761, 767 (1963). Under this minority rule, plaintiffs may amend their complaint at any
time prior to trial, and the amendment will relate back to the timely but defective complaint
and validate the proceedings regardless of the statute of limitations. 328 F. Supp. at 1061.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit regarded the North Carolina decisions denying relation
back as the recent and authoritative statement of the state's law. 615 F.2d at 610 n.4.
11 FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a),(c). Court should freely grant leave to amend when justice so re-
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subsections (a) and (c) of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 controlled
the motion to amend rather than the state laws governing plaintiff's
capacity."6 The court determined, however, that the amendment should
not overcome the statute of limitations bar. Accordingly, the district
court denied plaintiff's motion to amend and granted defendant's motion
to dismiss."8
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit agreed that the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure controlled the decision whether to allow the amendment, but
held that the district court had abused its discretion by denying leave to
amend."9 In the first step of the analysis, the Fourth Circuit in Davis
relied on Hanna to determine whether to apply Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15 or the state laws." Under Hanna, courts must apply a
federal rule despite a conflicting state rule if the federal rule is ap-
plicable and valid under the Constitution and the Rules Enabling Act."
quires. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Amendments brought after the expiration of the statute cf
limitations may be treated as part of the timely but defective complaint, thereby defeating
the statute of limitations time bar. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c). Courts will not allow the amend-
ment to relate back to the original complaint, however, if prejudice will result to the oppo-
nent's case. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c); see WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 66 at 311.
18 615 F.2d at 610-12; see notes 14 & 15 supra.
' 615 F.2d at 612. The district court noted four factors in refusing to permit the
amendment to defeat the statute of limitations. First, the plaintiff had failed to assert his
claim in prior actions. Second, the plaintiff delayed four months before correcting the defect
in his complaint. Third, in state court, plaintiffs motion would be denied and the case
dismissed. Finally, the Alabama state court had found plaintiffs decedent negligent and
plaintiffs decedent had admitted his negligence in prior proceedings. Id. at 612.
" Id. at 609.
Io d. at 611. The Fourth Circuit noted in Davis that Hanna should be applied when
state rules and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure conflict directly. Id. The Fourth Circuit did
not rely on Ragan v. Merchants Transfer Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949). 615 F.2d at
611. In Ragan, the Supreme Court held a state law that determined the method of tolling
the statute of limitations would prevail over a federal law requiring a different tolling
method. 337 U.S. at 534. The Davis court followed Hanna in distinguishing Ragan. See 615
F.2d at 611 n.8. In Hanna, the applicable federal rule was at least as broad in scope as the
conflicting state rule, while in Ragan the federal rule was not so broad. See 380 U.S. at
469-70. Similarly, in Davis the federal rule is at least broad as the state rule because applica-
tion of the federal rule specifically cures the deficiency of the plaintiffs complaint. 615 F.2d
at 611 n.8.
The dissenting opinion in Davis, however, contended that Ragan was controlling. Id. at
615 (Hall, J., dissenting). Judge Hall framed the issue in terms of which events can toll the
statute of limitations rather than whether an amendment can cure a lack of capacity. Id. at
614. If the issue did involve a direct statute of limitations question, Ragan would require the
court to apply North Carolina law that would preclude plaintiff from litigating his claim. Id.
at 615. The dissent erred, however, in construing the state wrongful death statutes as toll-
ing statues. Time is not an integral part of a wrongful death right of action, and therefore
the tolling of the statute of limitations is not a condition precedent to maintaining a
wrongful death action. See Kinlaw v. Norfolk So. Ry., 269 N.C. 110, 119, 152 S.E.2d 329, 336
(1967).
21 380 U.S. at 473-74; see text accompanying notes 23 & 40 infra.
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All of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are constitutionally valid
because they are authorized by Congress' Article III power over federal
court proceedings.' Courts, however, must engage in a more detailed
analysis under the Rules Enabling Act (REA), which requires that the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure in question must not abridge, enlarge, or
modify any substantive right.23 The Fourth Circuit determined that the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure was applicable to the conflict precisely
because use of the federal rule cured plaintiffs incapacity by allowing
the amendment." The Davis court reasoned that the federal rule was
valid under the Constitution," and under the Rules Enabling Act
because the federal rule did not impinge upon a substantive state right."
After determining that the federal rules did apply, the Fourth Cir-
cuit addressed the second issue, whether under the federal rules, the
district court should have granted leave to amend.' The Fourth Circuit
relied on Supreme Court precedent that trial courts should freely grant
leave to amend unless the amendment would prejudice the opposing
U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2; see Westen and Lehman, Is There Life For Erie After the
Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Westen]. Professor
Westen expressly noted that Rule 15(c) was constitutional. Id. at 363. The rule's purpose
and effect are entirely procedural, and therefore constitutionally valid. Id
" See note 6 supra. A substantive right is a fundamental, non-procedural rule which is
designed to regulate conduct and personal relationships outside the courtroom. See Ely,
supra note 5. at 725-27. Professor Ely defines substance as including everything which is not
strictly procedural. Id
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 impinges a substantive right by denying potential
defendants the right to rely on the expiration of the statute of limitations as a bar to further
action by the plaintiff. In practice, however, the substantive rights of both parties are ade-
quately protected because of the rule's notice requirement. See text accompanying notes
45-50 infra. See also Westen, supra note 22, at 363.
Under the Rules Enabling Act, the rule in question must be entirely procedural. See
note 6 supra. Professor Ely defines a procedural rule as one designed to make litigation fair
and efficient, notwithstanding the substantive effects of application of the rule. See Ely,
supra note 5, at 724 & n.170; text accompanying note 22 supra.
2" 615 F.2d at 611 n.8. The court noted that even if the Federal Rule was not directly
applicable under Hanna because it was not as broad in scope as the state rule, the Federal
Rule would still apply under the Erie doctrine. Id at 612.
The court did not indicate which portions of the state rule may have been unaddressed
by Federal Rule 15. Id Nonetheless, the court reasoned that application of the Federal Rule
would best meet Erie's twin aims of discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of in-
equitable administration of the laws. Id
The Fourth Circuit noted that Hanna requires courts to use Guaranty Trust's outcome
determination test, see note 5 supra, in conformity with Erie's twin aims when no Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure is directly applicable. 615 F.2d at 612. Forum shopping will not
result from application of the federal rule because the need for a rule allowing the amend-
ment will not arise until after a forum has been selected. Application of the federal rule
fosters equitable administration of the laws because state substantive interests will be ade-
quately protected as will federal procedural uniformity. Id.
615 F.2d at 612; see text accompanying notes 41 & 42 infra.
615 F.2d at 612.
Sid.
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party.' Although a trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion
for leave to amend, an appellate court may overturn a ruling on a motion
to amend if the lower court has abused its discretion.' The Fourth Cir-
cuit reasoned that since the defendant had notice of all the events giving
rise to the action, and of course, notice of the action itself, the amend-
ment would not prejudice the defendant in preparing his case." The
Fourth Circuit also reasoned that plaintiff§ delay in amending, absent a
showing of prejudice or designed dilatoriness, is an insufficient reason
for denial." Noting that the trial court had found no prejudice and had
denied the motion to amend on other inadequate grounds,32 the Fourth
Circuit held that the district court had abused its discretion in denying
leave to amend.
The Fourth Circuit accordingly allowed the plaintiff to amend his
complaint to cure his lack of capacity, 4 and then considered whether the
amendment could be treated as timely. 5 Under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c), an untimely amendment may overcome the statute of
limitations bar if the amendment concerns matters arising out of the
same occurrence set forth in the complaint and is not prejudicial to the
movant's opposing party. The Fourth Circuit concluded that the amend-
ment arose out of the occurrence alleged in the complaint because the
amendment concerned the plaintiff's capacity to bring suit. 6 The court
held that the amendment should relate back in time to the date of the
original timely complaint3
In deciding whether state or federal law should control the leave to
amend issue, the Fourth Circuit in Davis correctly relied on Hanna v.
Plumer. Hanna illustrates that a valid and pertinent federal rule takes
IId at 613. In Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962), the Supreme Court paralleled the
language of Federal Rule 15(a) to hold that courts should grant leave to amend freely when
justice so requires. Id. at 182. The Foman Court noted several factors that may cause pre-
judice and justify denial of leave to amend, including undue delay, bad faith, dilatory
motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, and futility. Id See generally Young, Review
of Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 49 A.B.A. J. 93 (1963). Since the critical factor in deter-
mining whether to allow an amendment is notice, no prejudice will ensue if the adverse party
has actual knowledge of the action and events giving rise to that action. See AKRON, supra
note 10, at 200; WRIGHT, supra note 4, § 66 at 311-13.
1 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330 (1970) (decision
to grant or deny amendments within discretion of federal district courts); Griggs v. Hinds
Junior College, 563 F.2d 179, 180 (5th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (abuse of discretion to deny
leave to amend if no indication of undue prejudice). See also 3 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
15.08[4] (2d ed. 1979).
615 F.2d at 613.
SI I&. The court noted that plaintiff's four month delay in qualifying did not seem
dilatory in light of defendant's five month delay in answering. IdA.
32Id.
3Id.
" Id. at 614.
" Id.
"1 Id; see note 28 supra.
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precedence over a conflicting state rule. 8 The Hanna Court held that a
federal rule's validity should be measured under the Constitution and
the Rules Enabling Act. 9 Hanna's requirement of pertinence dictates
that the federal rule should be at least as broad as the conflicting state
rule, and designed to apply to the situation at hand.0
The Fourth Circuit summarily disposed of the issue whether the
federal rule was valid under the Constitution and Rules Enabling Act."
Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are presumptively valid
under the Constitution, the court's cursory treatment of the constitu-
tional issue was sufficient.42 The court's Rules Enabling Act analysis,
however, was insufficient. The court should have considered whether ap-
plication of the federal rule impaired a substantive right protected by
state law.4" Davis held that the federal rule was valid under the Rules
Enabling Act simply because there had been no suggestion to the con-
trary.44 Nevertheless, the court's conclusion that the rule was valid
under the REA was correct because application of the federal rule did
not impair any state substantive right.4" The state's capacity re-
quirements render administrators subject to judicial supervision in
order to ensure equitable distribution of estates." The federal court
must respect the state substantive interest in an administrator's capa-
city.47 The only effect of rule 15 on the state's judicial supervision of ad-
' See 380 U.S. at 474; Westen, supra note 22, at 342. Professor Westen uses validity
and pertinence as shorthand terms for measuring the scope and applicability of a Federal
Rule. Id. Professor Westen defines validity as conformity to the Constitution and other
statutes regulating federal law. Pertinence means that the purpose of the rule would be met
by applying the rule. Id.
The Hanna Court limited its holding to situations in which state and federal law directly
conflict. 380 U.S. at 473-74. The conflict in Davis does not involve capacity, which the
Federal Rules do not speak to, but does involve leave to amend to reflect capacity. No con-
flict arises regarding capacity because the federal court necessarily requires an executor to
adhere to the state's substantive provisions creating capacity. The conflict arises because
under state law, the amendment will not cure plaintiffs incapacity. Under federal law,
however, the amendment will cure plaintiff's incapacity. 615 F.2d at 610; see notes 14-16
supra.
380 U.S. at 474; see note 6 supra.
40 380 U.S. at 468-69.
41 615 F.2d at 612.
' See U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2; see notes 6 & 22 supra.
The Hanna Court stressed that the E-ie doctrine is not the appropriate test of the
validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure. 380 U.S. at 470. The Erie doctrine was designed
to provide the appropriate analysis for the application of federal laws other than Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure because the Erie case did not involve a Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cbdure. Id. at 472-73. Whether the test is Erie or the Rules Enabling Act, a differentiation
between substance and procedure is still necessary. Id at 471; see notes 6 & 24 supra.
" 615 F.2d at 612.
4" See note 23 supra.
" See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-26-3 (1976); note 11 supra.
, The Supreme Court in both Erie and Hanna emphasized that legitimate state
substantive rights should never be impinged by federal courts. See notes 2 & 5 supra.
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ministrators is to allow an amendment showing an administrator's
capacity to relate back in time to the original complaint.48 The federal
rule does not supplant the state requirement that an administrator
possess the lawful capacity to distribute an estate's proceeds.49
Therefore, the state's substantive interest is fairly protected under the
federal rule."
Considering Hanna's requirement of pertinence, the Davis court cor-
rectly held that rule 15 was applicable to the plaintiff's attempt to prove
his capacity.5 The Fourth Circuit held, however, that the federal rule only
applied indirectly by analogy.2 Although the plaintiff moved to amend
his complaint, his amendment was more accurately a supplemental
pleading because he had alleged a subsequent matter, his qualification as
an ancillary administrator." The federal rules are silent as to whether
courts may treat supplemental pleadings as amendments for the purpose
of avoiding the statute of limitations bar. Nevertheless, if prejudice will
not result, the statute of limitations will not bar a pleading, whether the
pleading is supplemental or by amendment.55
Although the substance versus procedure distinction was the Erie
.decision's primary difficulty, in Hanna, the Supreme Court properly
recognized that in a conflict between a state rule and a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure, the substance versus procedure distinction is necessary
to ensure that the requirements of the Rules Enabling Act are met.5
Most courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have hesitated to rely on Hanna
because a thorough Hanna analysis usually requires a thorough Rules
Enabling Act analysis, 8 and the Rules Enabling Act requires a court to
See notes 14 & 15 supra.
" See note 11 supra.
'5 In Davis, FED. R. Civ. P. 15 allows the plaintiff to proceed with his claim when the
state rules would not. See notes 14 & 15 supra. Nevertheless, the federal rules do not allow
the plaintiff to proceed without ever qualifying as an ancillary administrator because allow-
ing an unqualified executor to sue is a substantive state concern. Id-
' See text accompanying note 40 supra.
' See 615 F.2d at 609 n.3.
Id A supplemental pleading is based on occurrences subsequent to the original
pleading. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(d). An amendment to a pleading sets forth any original matter
which was not adequately presented in the original pleading. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a), (c).
"FED. R. Civ. P. 15.
Rowe v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 421 F.2d 937, 944 (4th Cir. 1970). In
Rowe, the Fourth Circuit allowed a supplemental pleading to relate back to the timely com-
plaint after concluding that no prejudice would result. Id The policy that Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are to be liberally construed supports the Rowe court's treatment of sup-
plemental pleadings. See i& at 942-44.
' Prior to Hanna, the Supreme Court avoided the substance versus procedure distinc-
tion when refining Erie. See notes 5 & 6 supra; McCoid, supra note 3, at 884; Ely, supra note
6, at 694.
380 U.S. at 470-71.
See id at 471.
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